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I. TURRET-GUNNER NUMBER THREE
As his motorcade careened down a dusty Baghdad street, "Paul,"
turret-gunner number three, noticed a suspicious white car headed
purposefully toward him.' Paul waved his hands and signaled for the
driver to stop, but the car continued unabated. Believing that the
driver was an enemy target, and afraid for his life, Paul opened fire,
shooting his high caliber weapon until the threat was eliminated.
Swinging the muzzle around 180 degrees, Paul spotted a man in a blue
shirt and black pants aiming an AK-47 at the convoy's rear gunner, so
he once again squeezed the trigger, killing the man instantly. When
1. Brian Ross, Blackwater Turret Gunner 'Paul': Why I Opened Fire in
Baghdad, ABC NEWS, Nov. 14, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story
?id=386475 l&page=2. The following narrative is from a first-hand account of the
incident, given by a Blackwater security guard involved in the September 16, 2007,
shootings in Baghdad. Id.
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Paul's convoy finally rolled out of this area of Baghdad, at least
seventeen people were dead.2
Although it is easy to imagine this as a scene from a big-budget
summer movie, where a twenty-nine-year-old military hero named
Paul saves his convoy from vicious enemy forces, this event was all
too real and the people Paul shot were not enemy forces, but Iraqi
civilians.3 The man holding the AK-47 was an Iraqi police officer.4
And Paul was not a member of the U.S. military, but an employee of a
private military firm (PMF) known as Blackwater.5
The United States Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) proscribes a
set of rules by which soldiers must abide.6 Violating these rules can
result in reprimand, discharge from the military, or even imprisonment
in military jail.7 However, PMFs are immune from foreign, domestic,
or international law. 8 As a result, incidents like the one from
September 16, 2007, only serve to reinforce Iraqis' negative opinion
of American occupation forces and the impotence of Iraq's new
government.9
Under increasing pressure to "reign in" government contractors,
Congress recently introduced legislation purporting to give U.S.
civilian courts jurisdiction over all PMFs working abroad.' 0 However,
the wisdom and adequacy of this legislation is highly questionable;
federal district court is not the appropriate place to prosecute PMFs. It
would be manifestly unfair to the contractor being prosecuted,
ineffective for curing PMF misconduct, and inconsistent with the
international law of war.
By using PMFs in security roles, the government exposes
contractors to situations where the use of force may be required. 1 The
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2006).
7. See 10 U.S.C. § 858(a) (2006).
8. See infra Part III.
9. Steve Fainaru, Warnings Unheeded on Guards in Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec.
24, 2007, at Al.
10. Law Protecting Blackwater Under Fire, CBS NEWS, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://www.CBSNews.com.stories/2007/10/04/iraq/printable3328731 .shtml.
11. See Fainaru, supra note 9.
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duties performed by private security contractors like Paul mirror those
performed by the U.S. military. Why then should they not be subject
to the same rules of engagement and court-martial jurisdiction as other
combat troops?
II. INTRODUCING THE MODERN PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM
Use of civilians in military support roles is not a new concept;
civilians have accompanied military forces in nearly every major
military action in U.S. history.' 2 However, the size, organization, and
scope of services offered by modern PMFs like Blackwater are
without historical equivalence. In the 1991 Gulf War, for example,
there was one contractor for every fifty servicemen; by 2003, that ratio
had risen to one contractor for every ten servicemen in Iraq. 13
There are numerous reasons for the recent proliferation of PMFs.
The end of the Cold War brought with it a massive military
downsizing: around six million fewer soldiers globally. 14 In fact,
between 1990 and 2003, the U.S. government slashed its standing
military from 2.1 million to 1.4 million troops. 15 At the same time,
the demand for trained security contractors increased dramatically
with wars cropping up in Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan, and
Iraq.' 6 This was accompanied by a general shift in thinking that if a
task could be accomplished by the private sector, it should be.' 7
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld assured the nation that by
outsourcing everything except actual battlefield fighting, wars could
still be fought, and won, without increasing troop levels.' 8 Because of
12. William C. Peters, On Laws, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-
Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L.
REv. 367, 377-80 (2006).
13. Robert Marshall, Militarizing P3s: The State, New Public Management,
and Outsourcing War (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, York University).
14. Interview by Terry Gross with Peter Singer, The Iraq War Was the "First
Privatized War" (July 9, 2003), available at http://globalresearch.ca/
articles/SIN307A.htm1 [hereinafter Privatized War].
15. Jim Krane, Private Firms Do US Military's Work, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct.
29, 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/training/
1029private.htm.
16. Id.
17. Privatized War, supra note 14.
18. Krane, supra note 15.
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the increased role that technology plays in modem warfare, the
military is more reliant than ever before on the commercial sector for
weapon systems training and support.' 9 As a result, PMFs now
provide a variety of services including logistics, supply, weapons
disposal, transportation, defensive protection and security, and
military training for Iraqi forces. 20 Recently, PMFs have assumed
increasingly hazardous guard duties previously performed by military
personnel, such as protecting oil pipelines, museums, and diplomats.21
In previous wars, PMFs were prohibited from engaging in combat
operations, but on September 20, 2005, "the military issued an order
authorizing contractors to use deadly force to protect people and
assets. 22 In the eyes of many, this brought PMFs dangerously close
to being mercenary forces, 23 the use of which is prohibited by the
United Nations and Geneva Conventions.24 However, Blackwater
agents simply do not meet the definition of a mercenary force.
Article 47 of Protocol I of the 1977 Geneva Conventions 25 defines
a mercenary as an individual who: (1) is specifically recruited to fight
in an armed conflict; (2) takes part in direct hostilities; (3) is
motivated primarily by the promise of private gain; (4) is neither a
national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of a territory
controlled by a party to the conflict; (5) is not a member of the armed
forces; and (6) has not been sent by a state that is not a party to the
conflict.26 PMF contractors do not fit this definition because they are
19. Privatized War, supra note 14.
20. Doug Brooks, A New Twist on a Long Military Tradition, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 19, 2003.
21. See id.
22. Fainaru, supra note 9. See also Private Security Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform,
110th Cong. 7 (2007) (statement of Richard J. Griffin, Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State) [hereinafter Griffin].
23. Fainaru supra note 9.
24. Peter Warren Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Private
Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 526-28
(2004) [hereinafter Singer, Vacuum of Law].
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
26. Id.
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2008], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss1/7
2008] REGULATING THE UNITED STATES PRIVATE ARMY 201
not primarily recruited to fight,27 their primary motivation is not
necessarily private gain (many are former soldiers2 8 whose thirst for
action and sense of patriotic duty should not be discounted), and most
are American citizens, and thus a party to the Iraq conflict. 29 Because
a person must fit all of the criteria, PMF contractors clearly fall
outside of the Geneva Conventions' definition of mercenary forces. 30
PMFs also differ from mercenary forces in their organizational
structure. In general, mercenary forces are comprised of loosely allied
individuals that disband when the conflict, and the opportunity to turn
a profit, has ended.3' PMFs, on the other hand, are highly
sophisticated corporate and legal entities; most are publicly traded.32
'They work in more than one conflict at a time ... in more than one
place ... and they provide more than one service," including running
ROTC programs in over 200 American universities.33
Blackwater, for example, employs over 2000 security contractors
in nine corporate divisions that provide government services ranging
from weapons development and systems training to security and
protection for military and civilian personnel and assets. 34 Founded in
1997 by Erik Prince, a former Navy Seal, Blackwater recorded over
$800 million in sales in 2006 and is looking to expand.35 Although
Blackwater is one of the larger PMFs, it is not the only government
contractor in Iraq. 36 Currently an estimated 30,000 security contractors
27. Privatized War, supra note 14 ("They're often providing very innocuous
things like feeding troops or training people on how to use IT systems .... ").
28. Cf. Richard Lardner, Six-Figure Bonuses Retain US Commandos, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 2007.
29. However, some U.S. PMFs also hire foreign nationals, such as former
KGB agents or apartheid soldiers. See Privatized War, supra note 14.
30. JOANNA SPEAR, FArO MARKET FORCES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 47-48 (2006), available at
http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/531/531.pdf.
31. Privatized War, supra note 14.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. HOOVER'S IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, BLACKWATER USA (2007),
2007 WLNR 25030676.
35. Id.
36. Peter Warren Singer, Outsourcing War, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 222 (2005)
[hereinafter Singer, Outsourcing War]. "More than 60 firms currently employ more
than 20,000 private personnel there to carry out military functions." Id.
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are operating in Iraq at a total cost of over $4 billion.37 At least 6000
of these are armed.38
Contrary to popular belief, privatizing the military is expensive.
Government contractors are generally paid much more than U.S.
special forces.39 Some security contractors make up to $1500 a day,
which is over twenty times more than the $70 a day infantry soldiers
are paid. 40 However, PMFs' high contract costs are at least partially
mitigated by a reduction in the required number of standing military
troops, which require food and housing, training, and pensions.4'
A. The Benefits of PMFs
Unlike soldiers, civilian contractors can be hired for a specific
task and for a specific time, without the need to keep specialists on the
payroll any longer than their specialties are required.42 The lucrative
contracts awarded to PMFs ensure that they do not pull out of
dangerous areas, even when their agents are attacked by hostile
forces. 43 Security contractors are generally retired military and most
employers require at least one year of protective experience, which
suggests that they are professional, experienced, and well-trained.44
PMFs also provide non-economic benefits that make them
attractive to the U.S. government as an alternative to increased
military deployment. Often, PMFs are able to go where the U.S.
37. U.S. Government Investigates Iraq Security Contracting, INT'L Gov'T
CONTRACTOR, Sept. 2007, 1 69 [hereinafter Government Investigates].
38. Greg Guma, The Quiet Rise of National Security, Inc., TOWARD FREEDOM,
June 2004, http://www.towardfreedom.com/jun04/home/content/view/449/69.
39. Daniel Burton-Rose & Wayne Madsen, Corporate Soldiers: The U.S.
Government Privatizes the Use of Force, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Mar. 1999,
http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm1999/mm9903.07.html; Ken Miller, Outsource
This, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, May 6, 2004,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/05/b67759.html.
40. Burton-Rose & Madsen, supra note 39; Miller, supra note 39.
41. Nathaniel Stinnett, Note, Regulating the Privatization of War: How to Stop
Private Military Firms From Committing Human Rights Abuses, 28 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 211, 220 (2005).
42. Id.
43. Krane, supra note 15.
44. Government Investigates, supra note 37.
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military either cannot, or will not.45 For example, there are strict
regulations limiting the number of U.S. troops, and the scope of their
mission in Colombia;46 but there are now several PMFs working in the
country carrying out duties that U.S. troops cannot, including anti-
terrorism operations and high tech aerial reconnaissance.47
The death of a PMF agent generally goes unreported48 and
casualties among government contractors do not have the same
emotive impact as the death of a soldier.49 This makes their use
especially attractive to a government wishing to avoid the political
costs of an unpopular war.50 As Tim Spicer, CEO of Sandline, a PMF
that played a significant role in the civil war in Sierra Leone, points
out, "[m]ost of the people watching CNN or Newsnight will have the
same reaction [to civil war atrocities]: 'This is terrible. Something
must be done.' But when they are invited to send their husbands or
sons or daughters or pay for the operation . . . things are a little
different." 5' PMFs allow governments to use contractors to carry out
public policy through private means, thus avoiding the political costs
incurred when national troops are sent.52 However, these political
benefits come at a price: profits made by PMFs are often hidden
behind a corporate shield, making it difficult for the public and
Congress to accurately assess the economic feasibility of military
privatization. 5
3
45. See, e.g., Singer, Outsourcing War, supra note 36, at 123.
46. Privatized War, supra note 14.
47. Id.
48. See Krane, supra note 15; see also Stinnett, supra note 41, at 220. In fact,
between the start of the conflict in Iraq and March 2005, an estimated 175
contractors lost their lives and 900 more were wounded. Singer, Outsourcing War,
supra note 36, at 122.
49. Tim Spicer, Why We Can Help Where Governments Fear to Tread, May
24, 1998, http://www.times-archive.co.uk/news/pages/sti/98/05/24/sfirevopnO1005.
html?1621558.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Privatized War, supra note 14.
53. Krane, supra note 15.
203
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B. The Drawbacks of PMFs
Between January and October 2007, Blackwater agents killed or
injured over twenty Iraqi civilians,5 4 including those who died in the
aforementioned September 16 incident. 55 After a 2006 Christmas Eve
party in Baghdad, a drunken Blackwater employee fatally shot one of
Iraq's Vice-Presidential Guards.56 The contractor was fined, fired, and
returned home, but no charges were filed.57 Six weeks after this
incident, in February 2007, "a Blackwater sniper killed three security
guards [who worked] for the state-run media network., 58 On May 24,
2007, Blackwater agents killed a civilian driver outside the gates of
the Interior Ministry, which sparked a standoff between the agents and
Iraqi Security Officials.59
Other PMFs have similar histories of misconduct. DynCorp, one
of the Pentagon's largest contractors and a competitor of
Blackwater, 60 has in at least two prior operations stood by as several
of its employees were accused of engaging in perverse, illegal, and
inhumane behavior including purchasing illegal weapons, women, and
forged passports. 61 The site supervisor in Bosnia even videotaped
himself as he raped two young women.62 However, none of the
employees were ever prosecuted criminally. 63 In fact, the only court
cases that resulted from the incident were two civil actions filed
against DynCorp by employees who were fired for blowing the
whistle on the illegal activity. 64 After DynCorp lost the first suit, it
54. Joana Abrisketa, Blackwater: Mercenaries and International Law, FRIDE,
Oct. 2007, at 1-2, http://www.fride.org/download/blackwater.english.pdf.
55. See supra pp. 159-60.
56. Law Protecting Blackwater Under Fire, supra note 10.
57. Id.
58. Fainaru, supra note 9.
59. Id.
60. Burton-Rose & Madsen, supra note 39.
61. Singer, Vacuum of Law, supra note 24, at 525 (quoting John Crewdson, Sex
Scandal Still Haunts DynCorp, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2003, at C3).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Ian Traynor, The Privatisation of War, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/10/politics.iraq/print.
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quickly settled with the second plaintiff.65 It is difficult to determine
which is more unsettling: the actions of DynCorp's agents in the field,
or the corporate response to their misconduct.
In addition to contractor misconduct, the government's reliance
on companies motivated by profit, rather than national foreign policy
or security interests, raises concerns over possible conflicts of
interest.66 Between 1999 and 2002, three major government
contractors donated a combined $2.2 million to the Bush campaign
and other Republican causes.67 In fact, Halliburton won its lucrative
contract without a competitive bid,68 which begs the question: in light
of the political influence wielded by PMFs, is congressional oversight
really an effective method of regulation? The potential conflict of
interest inherent in this manner of regulation is illustrated by the State
Department's investigation of the September 16, 2007, shootings. 69
As the State Department's Inspector General, Howard Krongard is
in charge of investigating allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse,
including those relating to the September 16 shootings by Blackwater
agents in Baghdad. 70 His brother and former CIA director, Alvin
Krongard, recently accepted a consulting position on Blackwater's
advisory board. 7' Not only did Howard fail to disclose his brother's
employment, he denied it in front of the House Committee on multiple
occasions.72 While Howard was investigating Blackwater and Alvin
was being paid to sit on its advisory committee, the State Department
granted limited immunity to many of the agents who were involved in
65. Id.
66. Raenette Taljaard, Controls Needed to Rein in Private Military Firms,
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Straits-TimesControls.html.
67. Krane, supra note 15.
68. Id.
69. See generally Jeremy Scahill, The Blackwater Brothers: Conflict of Interest
in State Department IG Office, NATION, Nov. 16, 2007,
http://www.alternet.org/story/68134.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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the September shootings.73 Relying on this immunity, these agents
refused to cooperate with the FBI or answer its questions. 74
Although Howard Krongard has since resigned,75 the State
Department continues to lead investigations into alleged misconduct
of its own contractors,76 which is itself a significant conflict of interest
and underscores the difficulties in regulating PMFs. The government
relies heavily upon private security contractors and therefore has a
substantial interest in keeping them in Iraq. It is unrealistic and unwise
to expect the same government entity that awarded Blackwater a
security contract to conduct an impartial investigation into incidents of
misconduct. However, even absent these conflicting interests, it is
unlikely that the guards involved in the September 16 shootings would
have been prosecuted because they are virtually untouchable by any
legal entity under either domestic or international law.
C. Traversing a Legal "Black-Hole"
The day before Paul Bremer ended his tenure as administrator of
the U.S. provisional government in Iraq, he signed CPA Order 17,
granting U.S. contractors immunity from prosecution under Iraqi
law.77 As a result, the Iraqi provisional government was completely
impotent to prosecute PMFs, like Blackwater, for crimes committed in
Iraq.78 Now a sovereign nation, Iraq arguably has the authority to
prosecute Americans for crimes committed there.79 However, given
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Letter from Howard Krongard, Inspector Gen., Dep't of State, to President
George W. Bush (Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20071207160136.pdf.
76. Kirit Radia, Govt. Uses Contractors to Probe Iraq Contractors, ABC
News, Oct. 3, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=5951683&page=l.
77. Fainaru, supra note 9.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-788 (I), at 6 (2000). When a service member
commits a crime in a foreign country, whether he or she is court-martialed or
prosecuted under the laws of the foreign country is determined by the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA). Id. "[T]he typical SOFA gives American military
authorities the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over acts that violate United
States law." Id. However, the United States has yet to establish a SOFA with the
new Iraqi government. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Gates Seeks to Reassure Senate on
10
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the instability of the Iraqi government and the potential for human
rights violations, it is highly unlikely that the United States would
allow an American citizen to be tried under Iraqi law, especially when
the accused is an employee of the U.S. government. 80
The Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Act (SMTJ)8"
extends the jurisdiction of U.S. federal district courts to areas of the
high seas, as well as "[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of
the United States." 82 While this offers some jurisdictional authority
over contractor misconduct,83 it does not adequately create the judicial
ability to prosecute misconduct in an occupied foreign state during
wartime.8 4 In a 2003 radio address, President Bush stated that the
purpose of the United States' mission in Iraq was "to disarm Iraq of
weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for
terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people., 85 The President's statement
implied that once these goals were achieved, the country of Iraq would
be given back to the Iraqi people. With that stated intention, Iraq
cannot be accurately described as "lands reserved or acquired for the
use of the United States. 86 Therefore, under the SMTJ, Paul could not
be tried in U.S. district court for his role in the September 16
shootings in Nassor.
Recognizing the need for broader jurisdictional authority over
Americans working abroad,87  Congress enacted the Military
Iraq Agreement, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2008. Therefore, at least theoretically, U.S.
forces in Iraq could be subject to Iraqi jurisdiction. Mayur Patel, The Legal Status of
Coalition Forces in Iraq After the June 30 Handover, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW,
Mar. 2004, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh129.htm.
80. See Patel, supra note 79. In the majority of its SOFAs, the United States
retains jurisdiction over crimes committed by employees of the U.S. government
during the performance of their official duties (i.e., a soldier who mistakes a civilian
for an insurgent). See id.
81. 18 U.S.C § 7(1) - (9) (2006).
82. Id. § 7(3).
83. Arguably, the SMTJ would allow for prosecution of crimes committed on a
military base, embassy, or military vessel. See generally id. § 7.
84. Peters, supra note 12, at 387.
85. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Beginning of Operation
Iraqi Freedom (Mar. 22, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html).
86. 18 U.S.C § 7(3).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 106-778 (I), at 4-5 (2000).
207
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Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) on November 22, 2000.88
This act gives the federal district courts jurisdiction to try anyone
employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside the United
States for any crime that would be punishable by more than one year
of imprisonment. 89 However, the MEJA only applies to government
persons under contract with the Department of Defense. 90 Although it
purports to include contractors of any other federal agency, it only
does "to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission
of the Department of Defense overseas." 9 1 Arguably, Blackwater's
employment does support the war in Iraq.92 However, its primary
contractual responsibilities are diplomatic security and protection. 93
These are clearly State Department functions.94
Moreover, because the MEJA limits the scope of its prosecution
to crimes punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, 95 it does
not cover many instances of misdemeanor assault and battery, petty
theft, or sexual misconduct. Although Congress is currently working
to close the loopholes in the MEJA, the proposed legislation is
insufficient and will ultimately result in greater confusion regarding
the legal status of PMFs working in Iraq.
III. CONGRESS RESPONDS
There are currently several pieces of proposed legislation
circulating Congress that address the issue of PMF oversight. Senate
88. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2006). See
also Peters, supra note 12, at 390.
89. Peters, supra note 12, at 390.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3267.
91. Id. § 3267(1)(A)(ii)(H).
92. Keeping important diplomats and U.S. officials safe helps the war effort.
However, this seems like an overly broad interpretation of section 3267.
93. Blackwater's "WPPS earnings exceed many estimates of the company's
total government contracts." Jeremy Scahill, Mercenary Jackpot, NATION, Aug. 28,
2006, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060828/scahill (posted Aug. 10,
2006) [hereinafter Scahill, Jackpot]. A State Department program, the Worldwide
Personal Protection Service (WPPS), provides security for U.S. and foreign officials,
duties it contracts out to Blackwater. Id.
94. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399 § 102(a)(3), 100 Stat. 853.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (2006).
12
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Bill 239896 and House Bill 410297 require the government to phase out
the use of all security contractors over the next two years. 98 During
that two-year period, the legislation would require PMFs to certify
that each agent has undergone a background check, adopt "whistle-
blower" protection policies, and submit any contractor accused of a
crime on foreign soil to U.S. custody until the matter is fully
investigated.99 Those opposed to the increasing privatization of the
U.S. military believe that the benefits associated with PMFs have been
artificially inflated. "[H]iring private employees in Iraq at pay rates
several times more than what soldiers make ... has never been about
saving money. It's more about avoiding tough political choices
concerning military needs, reserve call-ups, and the human
consequences of war."' ° Contractors' lack of legal accountability has
also been cited by proponents of the proposed legislation as support
for the discontinued use of PMFs. 1
01
However, Congress should not act precipitously with regard to
PMFs. Phasing out private security contractors at this stage would
have a negative impact on the U.S. military10 2 and severely challenge
the ability of the United States to provide the level of security in Iraq
required by the law of belligerent occupation.' 0 3 The overthrow of
96. Stop Outsourcing Security Act, S. 2398, 110th Cong. (2007).
97. Stop Outsourcing Security Act, H.R. 4102, 110th Cong. (2007).
98. S. 2398; H.R. 4102.
99. S. 2398; H.R. 4102.
100. Peter W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST,
Sept. 12, 2004, at B3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/.A13378-2004Sepl 1.html.
101. See, e.g., Rep. Schakowsky Unveils Bill to Phase Out Private Military
Contractors, U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 2, 2007.
102. Fred W. Baker III, Gates Addresses Private Security Contractor Issues,
Am. FORCES PRESS SERV., Oct. 3, 2007.
103. Embodied in Hague Convention IV of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva
Conventions, the law of belligerent occupation requires a conquering military force
to take all reasonable measures to maintain law and order when the government of
the occupied territory is no longer capable of exercising its authority. Michal N.
Schmitt, The Law of Belligerent Occupation, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Apr. 15,
2003, www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnews/iraq5-print.htm. Officially the United
States is no longer an occupying force. Patel, supra note 79. However, the U.S.
Army Field Manual 27-10 also recognizes this duty stating: the occupying force
"shall take all the measures in [its] power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
209
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Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum, which the fledgling Iraqi
government has been thus far unable to fill. The ensuing lawlessness
has led to a drastic increase in violent crime. 10 4 Although the U.S.
government has recognized the need for social stability in Iraq, its
efforts toward that end have been thwarted by the continuing violence
and lack of security. 1
05
In this type of situation, a "military victory is likely to have little
impact on levels of societal violence, social fragmentation, and
criminalization of the economy."' 0 6 Instead, Iraq needs a well-trained,
permanent, and professional police force that is capable of
maintaining order. Without contractors to provide security and train
the Iraqi police force, the responsibility for restoring law and order
would fall upon the U.S. military. 07 According to Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, this would be "very counterproductive."' 8 After five
years of war, the American public is becoming impatient with the
ongoing violence. 10 9 In fact, President-elect Barack Obama has
pledged to begin troop withdrawal soon after taking office."0 PMFs
provide a solution to this problem. Arguably, PMFs could remain in
public order and safety." DEP'T OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD
MANUAL FM 21-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE § II 363 (1956), available at
http://faculty.ed.umuc.edu/-nstanton/Ch6.htm.
104. In the wake of the 2003 invasion, Iraq's government was largely
dismantled, which has led to an overall increase in sectarian violence as theocratic
groups vie for power. See, e.g., Yifat Susskind, Promising Democracy, Imposing
Theocracy: Gender-Based Violence and the U.S. War on Iraq, MADRE, at 8 (2007),
available at http://www.madre.org/articles/me/iraqreport.pdf.
105. See U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Rebuilding of Iraq: Stabilization,
Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges 1-2 (Feb. 8, 2006) (statement of Joseph
A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06428t.pdf.
106. SPEAR, supra note 30, at 39 (quoting Peter Lock, Military Downsizing and
Growth in the Security Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa, 22 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS,
Dec. 1999).
107. See Baker III, supra note 102.
108. Id.
109. Although support for the Iraq war is currently at its highest point since
2006, nearly fifty percent of the country believes U.S. troops should be brought
home "as soon as possible." David Paul Kuhn, Support for Iraq Highest Since 2006,
POLITICO, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0308
/9016_Page2.html.
110. Id.
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Iraq, performing security and training functions, even after the
withdrawal of U.S. troops.
Senate Bill 67411 and its counterpart House Bill 369112 take a
more moderate approach, attempting to "fix" the MEJA's
jurisdictional loophole. 13 The bills allow any PMF that provides
security services to be prosecuted in federal district court 14 and
require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue rules of engagement for PMFs
within fifteen days of any new contract.'1 5 Although the bill passed
the House of Representatives by a 389-30 vote, Republican
Representative Chris Shays accused Democrats of "rushing the bill
through Congress in a partisan bid to criticize the Bush
[A]dministration's handling of the war."" 6 "[T]he White House said
the bill would have 'unintended and intolerable consequences for
crucial and necessary national security activities and operations." 17
Although Senate Bill 674 and House Bill 369 would fix the
jurisdictional loopholes, the MEJA remains an ineffective,
impractical, and unfair method for prosecuting security contractor
misconduct committed under battlefield conditions. The State
Department has already demonstrated its unwillingness to cooperate
with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
screening the information Blackwater agents may provide with regard
to the September 16 shootings." 8 In fact, it was recently uncovered
that Blackwater has been involved in over 195 incidents involving the
111. Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act
of 2007, S. 674, 110th Cong. (2007).
112. Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act
of 2007, H.R. 369, 110th Cong. (2007).
113. The bills would require PMFs to provide information regarding the
number and type of duty each agent will perform under the contract, as well as
information about their training and the process used to hire them. It also requires
the government entity with whom the PMF has contracted to submit a report to
Congress detailing the terms of the contracts and a "catalogue of activities." S. 674;
H.R. 369.
114. S. 674; H.R. 369.
115. S. 674; H.R. 369.
116. Law Protecting Blackwater Under Fire, supra note 10.
117. Id.
118. See James Risen, Blackwater Inquiry Blocked by State Dept., Officials
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007.
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use of force since 2005.119 However, many of these were never
reported, including several involving the deaths of Iraqi civilians.1 20
Blackwater itself has been less than cooperative. For example, at a
hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, Blackwater made repeated claims that it could not produce
certain internal documents because they contained "classified
information."a12 Blackwater has also attempted to get the Department
of Defense to classify other previously unclassified documents' 22 and
is currently being investigated for tax evasion. 123 In light of the State
Department and Blackwater's track record of recalcitrance, it is
difficult to imagine that the bills' required "catalogue of activities"
will be sufficient to create a meaningful degree of congressional
oversight.
The MEJA allows security contractors to be prosecuted in U.S.
district court for conduct in foreign counties that would constitute a
crime punishable by more than one year of incarceration if committed
in the United States. 124 The wide jurisdictional reach established by
the MEJA was recently asserted by the U.S. government in the trial of
LaTasha Arnt. 125 Mrs. Arnt fatally stabbed her husband, Staff
Sergeant Matthias Anthony Arnt, during a domestic dispute on an Air
Base in Turkey.126 She was convicted in U.S. district court of
voluntary manslaughter and although the conviction was overturned
on appeal, 127 the court determined that jurisdiction was proper
pursuant to the terms of the MEJA. 128 However, several key
119. Rep. Woolsey Votes to Hold Military Contractors Accountable, U.S. FED.
NEWS, Oct. 4, 2007.
120. Id.
121. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT GOV'T REFORM, 110TH CONG., PRIVATE
MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER'S ACTIONS
IN FALLUJAH 14-15 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter COMM. ON OVERSIGHT
REFORM].
122. Id. at 15.
123. Evidence of Tax Evasion by Blackwater, U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 22, 2007.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (2000).
125. See United States v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).
126. Id. at 1161.
127. Id. The trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury
on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. See id. at 1165.
128. See id. at 1161-63 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)).
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differences between military dependants and security contractors
render the MEJA's jurisdictional reach inadequate and unjust when
applied to alleged contractor misconduct committed on the battlefield.
Assuming Paul, the turret-gunner described in the introduction,
fell within the MEJA's jurisdictional reach, he could theoretically be
prosecuted for murder in federal district court. However, Paul's
conduct presents a much more complex legal issue than that of Mrs.
Arnt. Unlike Mrs. Arnt, who fatally stabbed her husband while in her
domicile and on a military base, Paul fired his weapon at a number of
targets, in a warzone, whom he believed were enemy combatants.
Whereas Mrs. Arnt's crime parallels the many homicide cases
prosecuted under U.S. law; one would be hard pressed to find a
domestic analogue for Paul's misconduct. 129
Under federal law, "[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought."1 30  Malice aforethought "may be
shown by proof that the defendant, without justification or excuse,
intended to kill the victim or to do the victim grievous bodily
harm."'1 3' At first blush, this appears substantially similar to the
homicide statute contained in the UCMJ, which defines murder as the
unlawful killing of a human being, without justification or excuse. 32
However, the justifications, or excuses, for killing another human
contain subtle differences under civilian law as opposed to military
law. For example, Paul would likely claim self-defense as an excuse
129. In fact, it is better understood as a violation of the international law of
war. See infra Part IV.C.
130. 18U.S.C.§ 1111(a)(2006).
131. 40A AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 448 (1999).
132.
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse,
unlawfully kills a human being, when he-(l) has a premeditated design
to kill; (2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; (3) is engaged in an
act which is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton
disregard of human life; or (4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of burglary, sodomy, rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual
assault, aggravated sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact,
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual contact with a child,
robbery, or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such
punishment as a court-martial may direct ....
10 U.S.C. § 918 (2006).
213
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for his actions. As a civilian in federal district court, he would thus
have to prove that he:
(1) was under the unlawful and present threat of death or serious
bodily injury; (2) did not recklessly place himself in a situation
where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; and (3)
had no reasonable legal alternative (to both the criminal act and the
avoidance of the threatened harm). 133
This is an objective standard, 134 which means that Paul's mistaken
belief that he was under attack by hostile forces is only a defense if a
reasonably prudent person, faced with a similar situation, would have
reacted in the same manner.
Conversely, under military law, "a mistaken belief as to the
identity or status of a target would negate the state of mind required to
commit the offense of murder."' 35 Because "[e]very act that a soldier
performs in combat is inherently dangerous and calculated to harm the
enemy,"' 36 and civilians who engage in hostile military action are
lawful targets, 137 the self-defense requirements are necessarily broader
for soldiers than civilians. Therefore, Paul's actions would be
excusable under military law if it is determined that he reasonably
believed he was firing upon enemy combatants. However, even
though the MEJA, vis-A-vis the application of civilian law, arguably
establishes stricter requirements for a self-defense excuse, it would not
necessarily result in a greater number of convictions.
Because the MEJA would require Paul to be tried in U.S. district
court, any evidence or witnesses would have to be transported to the
United States. In cases involving military dependants, such as Mrs.
133. E.g., United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1989).
134. John F. Wagoner Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of
Reasonableness of Criminal Defendant's Belief for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim,
That Physical Force Is Necessary-Modem Cases, 73 A.L.R.4th 993, 997 (1989).
135. James A. Georges, Mistake of Fact Justifies Death of Civilian by
Negating Unlawfulness Required for UCMJ Article 118(3), ARMY LAW., Jan. 1995,
at 38.
136. Id.
137. E.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive Order on
Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 751, 783 (2003).
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Arnt, this requirement is not overly burdensome. 138 However, for
incidents such as the September 16 shootings in Nassor, the
investigation would be more difficult. Even if the FBI was able to
locate the Iraqi witnesses, foreign nationals cannot be compelled to
testify at trials held in the United States. 139 Because Paul has a Sixth
Amendment right to confront all witnesses against him, if the
prosecutor wanted to use eyewitness evidence, she would have to
produce the eyewitness. 140 It is very unlikely that an Iraqi civilian,
who recently witnessed his family member gunned down by an
American, would cooperate with FBI investigators, let alone willingly
travel to the United States to serve as a witness.
Assuming the prosecutor was able to produce an eyewitness who
testified that no shots were fired at Paul's convoy, the prosecutor
would still have to convince a jury of twelve Americans that the Iraqi
witness is more credible than Paul. Every American has viewed
images in the newspaper or on television of American soldiers who
have been slain by Iraqi terrorists. Terrorists do not wear uniforms or
carry identification; they look like civilians. Compared to an Iraqi
eyewitness, who may not speak English and is apparently
indistinguishable from those the media has labeled "terrorists," the
jury would likely find Paul very sympathetic.
Because of the problems inherent to the prosecution of security
contractors under civilian law and the desirability of continued PMF
operation, the MEJA is not the appropriate vehicle to regulate
contractors that perform what are essentially combat duties in a
warzone. 14 1 Instead, their actions should be evaluated in the context of
proper military conduct.
138. Arguably, crimes committed by spouses are likely to occur in relatively
secure areas. Evidence is undoubtedly easier to preserve on a military base than in a
hostile warzone.
139. Kevan F. Jacobson, Project, Restoring UCMJ Jurisdiction Over Civilian
Employees During Armed Hostilities, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, Mar. 15, 2006, at
12.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
141. Peters, supra note 12, at 387.
215
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IV. COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION AND CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS
Throughout American history, civilians have accompanied
military forces and supported troops in a variety of roles. During the
American Revolution, family members and servants, referred to as
"retainers," traveled and camped with the colonial soldiers. 142 Captain
Lewis and Lieutenant Clark employed a large number of civilian
adventurers on their expedition through the then uncharted wilderness
of the western United States. 14 3 During the Civil War, thousands of
civilian employees were used by Union forces to defend Nashville
while General Sherman marched through Georgia. 4 4 Civilian packers
accompanied Army cavalry and infantry units as they prepared to
attack Lakota Sioux during the Indian Wars in June of 1876; in fact,
the 7th Cavalry Unit routinely used civilian scouts and even employed
a civilian surgeon who died alongside General Custer at the infamous
Battle of Little Bighorn. 145 In World War I, civilian contractors served
as shipmates, cooks, and watchmen on Army transports. 146 Civilian
scientists conducted operational studies in hostile territory and civilian
engineers were taken prisoner by Japanese forces during World War
11.147 All of these civilian contractors were subject to military
jurisdiction pursuant to the evolving body of legislation discussed
below.
The original Articles of War, enacted by the First Continental
Congress in 1775 and 1776, provided for court-martial jurisdiction
over "all suttlers and retainers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever
serving with the armies of the United States in the field." 148 Under
142. Id. at 376.
143. See id. at 377. Nearly one-quarter of Lewis and Clark's expeditionary
force was comprised of civilian contractors. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 377-78.
146. Id. at 378.
147. Id. at 378-79.
148. Robert Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians
Accompanying the Armed Forces: A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. REV. 461,
482 (1961) (quoting Articles of War (1776) § XIII, art. 23, in 2 WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1478, 1497 (2d ed. 1896)). "Suttlers" is a Civil
War era term for camp followers who sold sundries to soldiers. Dan DeWitt,
20
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these provisions, many civilians were tried by military tribunals
during the Revolutionary War, primarily in areas where civilian courts
were not functioning effectively. 49 These provisions remained
essentially unchanged until 1916 when Congress adopted the War
Department's revisions to the Articles of War.150 Article 2(d) of the
proposed revision made accompanying civilians subject to court-
martial only for crimes committed while stationed outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States during peacetime or within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States during wartime.15 1 The
substance of this provision was adopted by the UCMJ, which was
enacted by Congress in 1950.152
A. Court-Martial During a Time of Peace
The current version of the UCMJ extends court-martial
jurisdiction to anyone "serving with, employed by, or accompanying
the armed forces outside the United States" during peacetime. 53
Blackwater agents operating in Iraq could be considered persons
serving with and accompanying the armed forces outside the United
States and therefore could be subject to military jurisdiction for
misconduct while in Iraq; however, judicial precedent suggests
otherwise. Despite the seemingly clear language of the UCMJ, a
civilian has not been successfully tried by general court-martial since
the 1958 trial of George Mountz, a civilian contractor working in
Korea at the end of the Korean War.' 54
In 1958, Mountz was employed by Vinnell, a defense contractor
based in California, which continues to provide goods and security
services to the U.S. military in Iraq as a subsidiary of Northrop
Grumman. 55 Responsible for maintaining power distribution systems
Getting the Feel of History, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan 16, 2003, available at
http:// www.sptimes.com/2003/01/16/Weekend/Getting-the-feel-of-h.shtml.
149. Girard, supra note 148, at 483.
150. Id. at 492.
151. Id.
152. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)-(11) (2006).
153. Id. § 802(a)(11).
154. Roger J. Miner, The Last Civilian Court-Martial and Its Aftermath, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 401, 407 (2006).
155. Id. at 406-07.
217
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in Korea, Mountz was also assigned the task of delivering Vinnell
payroll checks to the Army Finance Disbursing Office. 156 The
Disbursing Office then converted the payroll checks into Korean
Hwan,'57 at the official exchange rate of 500 Hwan to 1 U.S. dollar, 58
to pay Vinnell's Korean employees. At that time, Hwan could be
purchased on the black market in Seoul at the rate of 1000 Hwan for
every dollar. 159 Seeing an opportunity to make quick and easy money,
two military officers convinced Mountz to exchange the Vinnell
checks for military payment certificates (MPCs), the equivalent of
U.S. dollars, rather than Hwan. 160 Mountz then delivered the
certificates to the officers who exchanged half of them for Hwan
which they purchased on the black market. 16 1 Because the black
market exchange rate was double the official rate, Mountz was able to
pay Vinnell's Korean employees and the three men were able to
pocket the other half of the MPCs as profit.' 62
Military authorities discovered the scheme, arrested Mountz, and
confiscated his passport.' 63 Because his actions violated a provision of
the UCMJ, Mountz was tried by general court-martial. 164 The trial
began on August 6, 1958, and Mountz immediately moved to dismiss
the charges, arguing that the military lacked personal jurisdiction over
a civilian contractor. 165 Mountz claimed that he did not meet the
requirements of a person accompanying the armed forces because he
was not employed by the U.S. government, armed conflict had ended
before his arrival in Korea, and as a civilian he could not be
constitutionally subjected to trial by court-martial. 66 Mountz's
156. Id. at 407.
157. "Hwan" was the official currency of Korea during and immediately
following the Korean War. It was used until around 1962 when the "won" was
reintroduced as a means of controlling inflation. Kurt Schuler, Tables of Modern
Monetary History: Asia (Feb. 29, 2004), http://www.dollarization.org/asia.htm.
158. Miner, supra note 154, at 407.
159. Id. at 408.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 409-10.
166. Id. at 412.
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constitutionality challenge was not without merit; only a few years
earlier the U.S. Supreme Court decided the cases of United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles167 and Reid v. Covert (Reid II),168 declaring that
the court-martial proceedings violated the defendants' constitutional
rights. 169
In Toth v. Quarles, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
precluded a former serviceman from being court-martialed for
offenses committed during his military service but not prosecuted
until after he had returned to civilian life. 170 The Reid H opinion
actually covered two cases: Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger.17 1
Both of these cases involved military wives who killed their
servicemen husbands while living on military bases in foreign
countries. 172 Both women were tried in military court, convicted of
murder, and filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus challenging
court-martial jurisdiction. 173 In June of 1956, the Court upheld
military jurisdiction over the two women, declaring that the
prosecutorial protections provided by the U.S. Constitution did not
apply to civilians tried by the U.S. government on foreign soil. 174
However, this was not a unanimous decision; Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black and Douglas joined in a brief dissenting opinion,
and Justice Frankfurter withheld judgment, stating that the Court did
not have adequate time to deliberate since the case was heard so close
to the end of the term. 175
167. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
168. Reid v. Covert (Reid 11), 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
169. Miner, supra note 154, at 413; Toth, 350 U.S. at 11, 21; Reid II, 354 U.S.
at 5.
170. Girard, supra note 148, at 466.
171. Miner, supra note 154, at 413.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 413-14. Because both cases concerned the constitutionality of court-
martial jurisdiction of military dependants, the U.S. Supreme Court consolidated
them. Id.
174. Girard, supra note 148, at 467; Miner, supra note 154, at 414. Thus,
Congress was free to proscribe any manner of trial it deemed appropriate for
offenses committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, including
the court-martial of civilians accompanying the armed forces pursuant to the UCMJ.
Girard, supra note 148, at 467; see also Miner, supra note 154, at 413-14.
175. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 485 (1956); see also Girard, supra
note 148, at 469.
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The following year, the Court granted a rehearing of Reid H, and
after listening to additional arguments, withdrew its previous
decision. 176 This time, with two new justices on the bench, the Court
held that the United States is "entirely a creature of the Constitution,"
and Congress' power and authority only exists as far as it is authorized
by such. 177 Thus, the Constitution applies equally to trials at home or
abroad. Finding nothing within the Constitution that would authorize
the court-martial of military dependants, the Court held that "wives,
children and other dependants of servicemen ... do not lose their
civilian status and their right to a civilian trial because the
Government helps them live as a member of a soldier's family."' 178
However, the Reid II holding was narrowly interpreted by military
courts to apply only to dependants of military personnel in capital
cases. 179 This was the interpretation applied to the case of George
Mountz and, although his conviction was eventually set aside for other
reasons, the law officer in charge of the court-martial denied Mountz's
jurisdictional challenge stating that Mountz was "subject to military
rules, laws, and ... regulations."' 80
In 1960, less than two years after the Mountz court-martial had
ended, the U.S. Supreme Court ensured that Mountz would be the last
U.S. civilian convicted in military court with the opinions of Kinsella
v. United States ex rel. Singleton' 81 and Grisham v. Hagan.182 In
Singleton, the Court extended the holding of Reid II to civilian
dependants charged with non-capital offenses, overturning the court-
martial conviction of a military wife for manslaughter.183 In Grisham,
a civilian employee of the U.S. Army who was stationed at an Army
installation in France was tried by general court-martial and found
176. Girard, supra note 148, at 467-69.
177. Id. at 470.
178. Reid v. Covert (Reid 11), 354 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1957); Miner, supra note 154,
at 414.
179. See United States v. Wilson, 25 C.M.R. 322 (1958) (distinguishing
between overseas employees and overseas dependants in upholding court-martial
jurisdiction).
180. Miner, supra note 154, at 418, 422.
181. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
182. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
183. Miner, supra note 154, at 425-26.
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guilty of murder. 184 Grisham petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that Congress lacked the power to deprive him of a civil trial
under the Constitution.' 8 5 Applying Reid II, the Court stated that there
was no difference between a civilian dependant and a civilian
employee; the court-martial of any civilian accompanying the armed
forces outside of the United States, during peacetime, is
unconstitutional.' 18
6
Article I of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to "make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces,"' 187 which arguably includes the power to court-martial
civilians for conduct that relates to the armed forces. 188 However, in
Reid II, and by extension, Singleton and Grisham, the Court found that
the broad powers conferred upon Congress by Article I were
incongruent with Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution.
Article III states that "[t]he [t]rial of all [c]rimes . . . shall be by
j]ury.' 189 Court-martial trials are similar to civilian criminal trials in
some respects: a judge presides over the trial, the accused is entitled to
appointed counsel or may hire a civilian court-martial defense
attorney at his or her own expense, and the prosecutor must prove the
allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.' 90 However, there are key
differences. Notably, a military defendant is not entitled to a "jury"
trial. 191 Rather the accused must choose between trial by judge or
military panel. 192 Unlike a civilian jury, a military panel is comprised
of officers and enlisted personnel from the same command as, but of
higher rank than, the accused. 193 The panel is selected by the
184. Id. at 427.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
188. In order to properly regulate the armed forces, Congress must be able to
control the actions of civilians accompanying the armed forces.
189. U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2.
190. E.g., Michael Waddington, Court Martial: Process and Procedure, July
20, 2007, http://ucmjdefense.blogspot.com/2007/07/courts-martial-process-and-
procedure.html.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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convening authority and although both the prosecution and defense
are permitted to voir dire the panel members, each side may only
preemptively strike one panel member.'
94
The Fifth Amendment gives an accused the right to a grand jury
indictment in capital cases and guarantees that a criminal defendant
will not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."' 95 Grand juries do not exist in military courts. 196 Rather, when
the military suspects that a crime has been committed, a military
officer conducts a pre-trial investigation pursuant to Article 32 of the
UCMJ.' 97 If the investigating officer's suspicion is confirmed, he may
recommend that the convening authority initiate court-martial
proceedings. 198
In a civilian trial, the jury must make a unanimous decision to
convict or acquit. When a jury cannot agree on a verdict, a mistrial
results and the prosecution must decide whether to try the case in front
of a new jury or dismiss the charges. However, "hung juries" do not
exist in military court.' 99 With the exception of death penalty cases,
the prosecutor will obtain a conviction if only two-thirds of the
military panel find the defendant guilty. 200
Unlike a civilian jury, a military panel is not only responsible for
determining guilt; it also decides what sentence to impose and may
even ask questions of witnesses. 20 1 However, because the accused is
entitled to representation during the investigation, can interview and
cross-examine witnesses, and is able to review all evidence compiled
against him, the abridgment of a civilian's right to grand jury
indictment is one of form rather than substance.20 2 Similarly, in a
military trial, if the trial does result in a conviction, the defendant is
entitled to an extensive process of appellate review, ensuring adequate
194. Id. As opposed to three in a civilian trial. The Free Dictionary,
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.comfPreemptory+challenge.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
196. See Waddington, supra note 190.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Peters, supra note 12, at 409.
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due process protections.2 °3 The UCMJ also provides protections
against self-incrimination that mirror the rights contained in the Fifth
Amendment.
20 4
The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant in a criminal prosecution
the right to "a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime [was] committed., 205 Although military
trials are generally open to the public, the military judge may close the
proceedings when dealing with sensitive or classified material.20 6 The
accused is entitled to an impartial court-martial panel, 207 but in
situations like Reid v. Covert, where a civilian is accused of murdering
a service member, it is easy to see where any panel comprised of
military officials may harbor bias.
However, even in Reid II, the Court recognized that this
constitutional analysis changes during a time of war, stating that "[i]n
the face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders
necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront. '2 °8
Moreover, the Court explicitly recognized that there may be
"circumstances where a person could be 'in' the armed
services. . . even though he had not formally been inducted into the
military., 20 9 The Reid II holding did not extend to these situations,
which suggests that the Court would not find the UCMJ provision
extending military jurisdiction to civilians accompanying the military
in the field during "a time of war" unconstitutional. However, the
military has had an equally difficult time prosecuting civilians during
war time as it has during a time of peace because of the way the
phrase "in a time of war" 21° in section 802a(a)(10) has been
interpreted.
203. Id.
204. 10 U.S.C. § 83 1(a) (2006). "No person subject to this chapter may compel
any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which
may tend to incriminate him." Id.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
206. Waddington, supra note 190.
207. Id.
208. Reid v. Covert (Reid ll), 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957).
209. Id. at 22-23.
210. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (the 2005 version stated: "[iun time of war,
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field"). See John
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B. Court-Martial During a Time of War
In 1969, Raymond Averette, a civilian contractor working at
Camp Davis in South Vietnam, was arrested for conspiring to steal
36,000 batteries from the U.S. government.2 1  Relying on section
802(a)(10) of the UCMJ, Averette was tried and convicted in military
court. 2 12 However, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals overturned his
conviction, construing the language "in a time of war" to mean "a war
formally declared by Congress., 213 Because Congress never declared
war against North Vietnam, the court found that the military lacked
jurisdiction over Averette under section 802(a)(10), and the case was
dismissed.214
The current conflict in Iraq has many parallels to the Vietnam
War, including the fact that war was never formally declared against
Iraq.215 Even if it had been, President Bush announced that the combat
mission in Iraq was over in 2003.216 Therefore, pursuant to U.S. v.
Averette, it seems unlikely that court-martial jurisdiction could be
extended to cover Blackwater security agents working in Iraq.
However, the uncertainty over what Congress intended by the phrase
"in a time of war" was partially resolved by a 2006 amendment to the
UCMJ which changed section 802(a)(10) to read "[in a] time of
declared war or a contingency operation."
2 17
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006).
211. Peters, supra note 12, at 394.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 395 (quoting United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (1970)).
214. United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365-66 (1970).
215. Michael C. Dorf, Why Congressional Power to Declare War Does Not
Provide an Effective Check on the President, Mar. 6, 2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020306.htnl.
216. President George W. Bush, President Declares End to Major Combat in
Iraq (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/01/
iraq/main551946.shtml [hereinafter President Declares End to Major Combat in
Iraq].
217. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006). A "contingency operation" is defined as
any military action "designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions." Id. §
101(a)(13)(A).
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Although the situation in Iraq would clearly qualify as a
contingency operation, it is still not certain that this revision is
sufficient to allow the military to court-martial Blackwater
contractors. Despite the favorable dicta in Reid II, the Supreme Court
has not ruled on the constitutionality of civilian court-martials during
a time of war and it may view the 2006 revision as an unconstitutional
expansion of military jurisdiction. 218 Moreover, President Bush's 2003
statement that combat operations in Iraq were over 219 could preclude
the current occupation from section 802(a)(10)'s definition of
wartime, even with the 2006 amendment.
The other problem with applying section 802(a)(10) to Blackwater
contractors is that it only applies to persons "serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field. 22° Unlike civilian
contractors in prior wars who either traveled on military vessels, with
military escorts, or were stationed on military bases,22' Blackwater
security contractors often operate independently of the U.S. military.
For example, in April of 2004, eight Blackwater agents, without the
help of the U.S. military, successfully repelled an attack on the
Coalition Provisional Authority office in Najaf that was launched by
heavily armed followers of Moqtada Sadr, a radical Shiite cleric. 222
Prior to the September 16, 2007, incident, the military was not
apprised of Blackwater's activities or locations within Iraq, did not
accompany security contractors on their missions, nor did it restrict
their use of force.223 Moreover, Blackwater's contract is with the State
Department, not the Department of Defense, and Blackwater is not
assigned to a specific military installation. 224 Thus, it is questionable
whether Blackwater really accompanies "an armed force in the field."
218. Anthony E. Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute
Violations of the Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV.
699, 719 (2007).
219. President Declares End to Major Combat in Iraq, supra note 216.
220. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).
221. See supra pp. 216-28.
222. Marshall, supra note 13, at 2.
223. Peter Grier, More Curbs on Private Iraq Guards:The Pentagon and State
Department Agree on More Military Oversight, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 11,
2007, available at www.cwmonitor.com/2007/1 10 l/p 0 1 s02-usfp.html?page=2.
224. See, e.g., Government Investigates, supra note 37.
225
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Even if section 802(a)(10) was sufficient to prosecute Blackwater
security contractors currently operating in Iraq, it does not adequately
solve the problem from a long-term perspective. As previously
mentioned, PMFs can be very useful as peacekeeping and
reconstruction forces. Because it is unlikely that the Iraqi government
will be able to provide adequate security and police forces without
external support, PMFs will continue to play an important role in Iraq
after U.S. troops have been withdrawn. Therefore, Congress must find
a way to ensure the military retains jurisdiction of security contractors
beyond "a time of declared war or contingency operation." 225
Although the Supreme Court found the court-martial of civilians
during peacetime unconstitutional, the court-martial of Blackwater
security contractors would not be inconsistent with the holding in Reid
//; Blackwater agents may not be part of the U.S. military, but they are
not "civilians" either.
C. The International Law of War
Throughout history, warring nations have distinguished between
appropriate and inappropriate military targets, generally concluding
that attacks on non-combatants are inappropriate.226 The international
law of war embodied in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions (Protocol 1)227 embraces the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants, defining the former as "[m]embers
of the armed forces of a Party to [the] conflict., 228 Non-military
personnel are thus considered non-combatants. As such, they are
protected from attack but are also precluded from directly
participating in hostilities.229 Although the United States is not a party
to Protocol 1,230 the UCMJ makes similar distinctions between military
forces and civilians. 23' Blackwater security contractors do not fit
225. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).
226. A.P.V. Rogers, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 8 (Dominic McGoldrick ed.,
2d ed. 2004).
227. Protocol I, supra note 25.
228. Id. at art. 43.
229. Id.
230. A list of countries that signed Protocol I is available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/websign?readform&id=470&ps=P.
231. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) (2006) (defining armed forces).
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nicely into either of these categories. They are not a part of the U.S.
military, so they do not meet the definition of "combatant," but they
are heavily armed and authorized to use force in carrying out their
missions so they cannot accurately be described as "non-combatants"
either. Protocol I does not clearly define what constitutes "direct
participation in hostilities," but the U.S. military does, and it includes
gathering intelligence and serving as a lookout or guard in its
definition of "direct participation. "232 Applying this standard to
Blackwater leads to bizarre and troubling results: officially, security
contractors are considered "civilians," yet the guard duties performed
by Blackwater agents would fall within the military's definition of
"direct participation in hostilities." This makes them "unlawful
combatants," which strips them of the benefits provided by the
Geneva Conventions and exposes them to possible prosecution as war
criminals. 23
3
The 1949 Geneva Conventions establish conditions for fair
treatment of prisoners of war and provide combatants special
protection and treatment, including immunity from prosecution for
normal acts of warfare. 234 A combatant's use of deadly force against
an enemy is considered a legitimate State action, 235 for which he
cannot be criminally prosecuted.236 However, the same privileges do
not extend to non-combatants. 237 Therefore, if Blackwater agents are
truly "civilians," their use of deadly force can only be justified upon a
theory of self-defense. This places the contractor in a precarious
situation: if he is too slow to fire upon a perceived threat, the safety of
his convoy is placed into jeopardy, but if he fires before the threat
evolves to a point that necessitates the use of deadly force, the
232. Micheal E. Guillory, Civilianzing the Force: Is the United States Crossing
the Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. REv. 111, 117-18 (2001).
233. J. Riccou Heaton, Civilians at War: Re-Examining the Status of Civilians
Accompanying the Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. REv. 155, 195 (2005); Guillory, supra
note 232, at 114; see also NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL No. 10, at 1244 (1950) ("[A] civilian who aids, abets or participates in the
fighting is liable to punishment as a war criminal under the law of war.").
234. Singer, Vacuum of Law, supra note 24, at 526-27.
235. See generally Marshall, supra note 13, at 8-9.
236. Singer, Vacuum of Law, supra note 24, at 526-27.
237. Heaton, supra note 233, at 195.
227
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contractor could be held criminally liable for the injuries he inflicts.
Thus, bringing PMFs under military regulation not only serves the
interests of justice in prosecuting contractor misconduct, it protects
security contractors by legitimizing their use of force under the law of
war.
As previously noted, there are substantial constitutional obstacles
to court-martialing civilian contractors under section 802(a)(10) and
802(a)(11) of the UCMJ. However these constitutional issues can be
avoided by giving the President the power to transfer members of the
State Department's diplomatic security service to the armed forces.
V. ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, MARINES, AND ... BLACKWATER?
In 1987, the Supreme Court held that court-martial jurisdiction
rests solely upon a person's status as a member of the armed forces.238
Thus, to ensure that court-martial jurisdiction can be constitutionally
applied to security contractors, their official status must be changed
from "civilian" to "military." Congress' recent attempts to cure the
defect in section 802(a)(10) of the UCMJ demonstrates its intent to
extend court-martial jurisdiction to security contractors operating in
Iraq.239 In fact, Pentagon Spokesman Geoff Morrell, President George
W. Bush, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter
Pace, and Blackwater founder Erik Prince have all expressed a desire
to integrate private security contractors into the armed forces.24 °
A. The Many Proponents of Military Integration
In response to the September 16 shootings, the Pentagon and State
Department announced plans to increase the level of military
oversight over Blackwater employees operating in Iraq. 24 1 Pentagon
spokesman, Geoff Morrell, stated that the military would begin to
oversee contractor training, implement more restrictive rules of
engagement, and control the movements of Blackwater agents in
Iraq.242 President George W. Bush took the concept of military
238. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987).
239. See supra p. 28 and note 217.
240. See infra Part V.A.
241. Grier, supra note 223.
242. Id.
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oversight one step further, announcing plans to develop a "civilian
reserve corps" in his 2007 State of the Union address. 243 The President
explained that the "corps would function much like [the] military
Reserve. It would ease the burden on the armed forces by allowing
[the government] to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on
missions abroad when America needs them.",244 General Peter Pace,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed the President's
optimism, saying he was "enthusiastic about the opportunity that this
concept of a civilian reserve corps presents for the nation." 245 This
concept also appeared in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review.246 In assessing the current and future
strength of the U.S. war-making machine, he concluded that the
United States' "Total Force" consisted of four elements: active troops,
reserve troops, contractors, and civilians.247 Arguably, this not only
demonstrates that the Department of Defense views contractors as a
part of the total military force, but that it also draws a distinction
between contractors and civilians.
Even Blackwater's founder, Erik Prince, favors military
integration. At a military conference in 2005 he proposed the idea of
establishing a "contractor brigade" comprised of Blackwater
contractors. 248 With a fleet of over twenty aircraft and 20,000 trained
soldiers, Prince suggested that Blackwater is not only ready to deploy,
but could do so for less than the $3.6 billion it would cost the
Pentagon to add the same number of troops to the standing military. 249
243. Yusuf Alabarda & Rafal Lisowiec, The Private Military Firms-
Historical Evolution and Industry Analysis, June 2007, at 49 (M.B.A. dissertation,
Naval Postgraduate School), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473255&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
244. Jeremy Scahill, Bush's Rent-an-Army, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A23,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/25/opinion/oe-scahil125 [hereinafter
Rent-an-Army].
245. Linda D. Kozaryn, Chairman Fields Troops' Questions, AM. FORCES
PRESS SERV., Feb. 26, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
NewsArticle.aspx?ID=3182.
246. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REvIEw REPORT (2006), at
75, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/ qdr-
2006-report.htm.
247. Id.
248. Alabarda & Lisowiec, supra note 243, at 49.
249. Rent-an-Army, supra note 244.
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Although Prince's proposal for an entire brigade of private soldiers is
a bit more ambitious than the President's "civilian reserve corps," 250 it
demonstrates that the White House, the Pentagon, and Blackwater not
only recognize the necessity of military/contractor integration, they
also believe it will be mutually beneficial.
B. Using the Existing Framework of the UCMJ
Currently, Blackwater's $320 million contract is paid under the
State Department's Worldwide Personal Protective Service (WPPS)
program.251 The WPPS was created by the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,252 which increased the
funding available to the State Department to "counter acts of terrorism
and protect and secure United States Government personnel and
missions abroad. '253 Under this program, the State Department is
authorized to employ "special agents" to protect "official
representatives of the United States government, in the United States
or abroad. ' '254 The need for the services of the WPPS has increased
dramatically over the past decade, especially in recent years because
of the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. 255 As a result, the State
Department said it is "unable to provide protective services on a long-
term basis from its pool of special agents," opting instead to contract
with PMFs like Blackwater to fulfill its security obligations. 25 6 These
agents are authorized to use deadly force in executing their contract 257
250. Erik Prince envisions a brigade of battle-ready soldiers while President
Bush's plan would use the civilian corps for rebuilding foreign infrastructure. Id.;
see also Kozaryn, supra note 245.
251. Scahill, Jackpot, supra note 93.
252. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L, No.
99-399 §§ 201-03, 100 Stat. 853.
253. Id. § 102(a)(3).
254. 22 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006).
255. See Fred Burton & Scott Stewart, Security Contractors in Iraq: Tactical
and Practical Considerations, STRATFOR, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/
weekly/security-contractorsiraqtacticaland-practical-considerations.
256. Scahill, Jackpot, supra note 93.
257. Griffin, supra note 22, at 7.
[The] policy utilizes a seven-step process . . . (1) English/Arabic visual
warning signs on vehicles; (2) hand/verbal warning signs; (3) use of bright
lights; (4) use of Pen flares; (5) weapon pointed at offending vehicle; (6)
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but are not under the command or control of the U.S. military.25 8
Understandably, this can cause confusion on the battlefield. Security
contractors are often mistakenly fired upon by American military
forces that were unaware the contractors were operating in the area. 259
By coordinating the movements of Blackwater guards with military
commanders, these types of "blue on white" 260 incidents could
arguably be avoided.
The current lack of coordination between security contractors and
the military also has indirect, though no less significant, effects on
military troops. On March 31, 2004, four Blackwater guards were
escorting a convoy of kitchen equipment when they were ambushed
and killed in Fallujah.261 A few days later, the Marines were sent into
Fallujah to find the insurgents who had killed the Blackwater
guards. 262 The Marines had planned to deal with the ongoing violence
in Fallujah through diplomatic action, establishing trust with local
residents by rebuilding infrastructure, but unfortunately this ambush
dictated a forceful Marine response.263 As a result, not only were the
lives of these Marines placed in danger, but the image of American
troops in general was significantly tarnished. As Marine Colonel John
Toolan explained, "we were going in as [Fallujah residents'] worst
enemy, and it's tough to come back from that."264
It is important to note that security contractors are often dressed in
camouflaged uniforms with American flags sewn onto the shoulders,
shots fired into engine block of vehicle; and (7) shots fired into windshield
of vehicle. It should be noted that deadly force can be immediately applied
provided that it is necessary under the specific situation's circumstances.
Id. at 7-8.
258. Bobby A. Towery, Research Paper, Phasing Out Private Security
Contractors in Iraq, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (Mar. 15, 2006).
259. Alabarda & Lisowiec, supra note 243, at 41.
260. Id.
261. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT REFORM, supra note 121, at 2. See also Frontline:
Private Warriors (PBS television broadcast June 21, 2005), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/etc/script.html [hereinafter
Frontline: Private Warriors].
262. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 261.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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nearly identical to those worn by U.S. soldiers. 265 This makes it
difficult for Iraqi civilians to distinguish between Blackwater
contractors and U.S. soldiers.266 Thus, incidents of contractor
misconduct not only reflect poorly upon contractors but on American
forces in general. Arguably, the establishment of a stable government
in Iraq requires the cooperation of the Iraqi people. This means that
the U.S. government should have a strong desire to control the actions
of Blackwater contractors if for no other reason than to improve
America's image in Iraq.
Section 802(a)(8) of the UCMJ confers military jurisdiction over
"[m]embers of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
Public Health Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and
serving with the armed forces. 267 One of the main purposes of the
military justice system is to maintain "the good order and discipline of
the military unit. "268 Therefore it is not surprising that members of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) would be
subject to military authority when "assigned to and serving with the
armed forces"; 269 their physical proximity to and reliance upon
military troops could impact the maintenance of order and discipline
of the unit to which they are assigned. 270 Although Blackwater agents
do not necessarily work in close proximity with military forces, as
265. Privatized War, supra note 14.
266. Id.
267. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(8) (2006).
268. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilianization of the
Battlefield: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting Military-
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilian Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491, 493
(2008).
269. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(8).
270. See Corn, supra note 268, at 519 ("[T]he military-justice system is
intended to serve two distinct yet hopefully complimentary functions: achieving
justice while contributing to the good order and discipline of the military unit."). "It
is DoD policy that the requirement for order and discipline of the Armed Forces
outside the United States extends to civilians employed by or accompanying the
Armed Forces...." DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION No. 5525.11, CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS EMPLOYED BY OR ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED
FORCES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, CERTAIN SERVICE MEMBERS, AND FORMER
SERVICE MEMBERS 3 (2005), available at http:l/www.dtic.millwhs/directives/corres/
pdf.55251 lp.pdf.
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previously noted, the ramifications of their conduct significantly
impacts the effectiveness of the armed forces.
The President has the authority to "transfer to the service and
jurisdiction of a military department ... officers of the [National
Oceanic and Atmospheric] Administration as the President considers
to be in the best interest of the country."27 ' The exercise of this power
triggers the jurisdictional guarantees of section 802(a)(8) 27 2 and brings
the NOAA within the purview of military authority. 273 Congress
should give the President similar power over special agents working
for the State Department's WPPS program by passing legislation
worded as follows: "[tihe President may, during a time of war,
contingency operation, or national emergency, transfer to the service
and jurisdiction of a military department, persons employed by or
contracting with the State Department for the provision of diplomatic
security services in an area designated as a combat zone."
2 74
This provision is intentionally narrow and would only apply to
security contractors performing diplomatic protection duties during
military deployment and in the zone of combat. It would thus
eliminate the coordination and jurisdictional issues with regard to
contractors who perform military functions in Iraq, without subjecting
other government contractors, who do not perform military functions,
to court-martial jurisdiction. 275 Blackwater would clearly be covered
by this provision: (1) the conflict in Iraq qualifies as a time of war, a
contingency operation, or a national emergency; (2) Blackwater is
271. 33 U.S.C. § 3061 (2006).
272. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(8) requires the NOAA personnel to not only be
"serving with" but also "assigned to" the armed forces.
273. See id. § 802(a)(10).
274. Proposed legislative solution is modeled on the language of 33 U.S.C. §
3061 (2002).
275. The MEJA and the UCMJ have concurrent jurisdiction over civilian
contractors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(c) ("Nothing in this chapter may be construed to
deprive a court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried by a court-martial . . . ."). Thus, contractors
who do not perform combat function under the diplomatic protection program would
be governed by the MEJA. Because these contractors are more easily identified as
civilians, and their misconduct more closely related to violations of U.S. law rather
than the international law of war, prosecution in federal district court would be
appropriate.
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under contract with the State Department to provide diplomatic
security and protection in Iraq; and (3) Iraq is currently designated as
a combat zone.2 16 Thus, this provision would be sufficient to vest in
the President the power to assign Blackwater security contractors to
military authority pursuant to section 802(a)(8).
Even though section 802(a)(8) already applies to "other
organizations, "277 to eliminate any chance of confusion, it should be
revised so as to explicitly apply to the State Department's diplomatic
security program. Thus, section 802(a)(8) would read: "Members of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health
Service, the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service, and
other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed
forces."
In addition to being assigned to the military, section 802(a)(8)
also requires that the members be "serving with the armed forces. 278
Whether a person is "serving with the military" depends upon the
existence of a close relationship to the armed forces "that is more
direct than simply accompanying the armed forces in the field., 279
Although Blackwater would not fit this definition as civilians under
section 802(a)(10) or (11),280 transferring its service from the State
Department to the military would arguably establish a sufficiently
close relationship for the purposes of section 802(a)(8).
VI. CONCLUSION
Because Blackwater contractors would now have military
status, 281 they would fit the Reid II Court's characterization of a
276. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FINANcIAL REGULATION
MANAGEMENT, Vol. 7A, Ch. 10, § 1001(01) (2008), available at http://www.
marquette.edu/sla/documents/hostilefire.pdf.
277. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(8).
278. Id.. § 802(c).
279. United States v. Phillips, 58 M.J. 217, 220 (2003); see, e.g., United States
v. Garcia, 17 C.M.R. 88 (1954); United States v. Schultz, 4 C.M.R. 104 (1952).
280. See supra Part IV.B.
281. See 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(A) (2006). Uniformed service means "(A) the
armed forces; (B) the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration; and (C) the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service." Id.
at § 101(a)(5). As a member of WPPS, under the proposed legislative solution
Blackwater would stand in a similar position to NOAA and PHS and should
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person who is "'in' the armed services . . . even though he had not
formally been inducted into the military., 282 Thus, any jurisdictional
or constitutional concerns would be alleviated.283 Giving Blackwater
security contractors military status would also solve the international
concerns regarding their mission in Iraq. As members of the armed
forces, the security guards would be considered lawful combatants and
would be entitled to the same prisoner of war and use of force
protections as regular military troops. The contractors would also have
clearly delineated rules of engagement, which would decrease the
likelihood that another incident like the shootings on September 16
would occur.
With no end to the Iraq conflict in sight, security contractors like
Paul and his Blackwater brethren will continue to play an important
role in carrying out U.S. foreign policy. Although the desirability of
this arrangement remains debatable, a comprehensive system of
regulation and control will go a long way toward appeasing
Blackwater opponents. Although the MEJA provides a suitable
framework for the regulation of contractors who perform civilian
functions, for the reasons previously enumerated, the UCMJ provides
a more effective and fair system for regulating Blackwater and other
contractors that provide diplomatic security for the Department of
State.
Jon Cadieux*
arguably be considered part of the "uniformed service." At the very least, its
civilian status would be lost upon presidential transfer to military authority.
282. Reid v. Covert (Reid 11), 354 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1957).
283. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987).
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written with gratitude for the sacrifices of our soldiers and contractors serving
abroad, and with hope that peace will soon bring them home.
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